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Abstract
This paper uses an econometric approach to examine the inflation consequences of the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021. Price equations are
estimated and used to forecast future inflatin. The main results are: 1) The
data suggest that price equations should be specified in level form rather
than in first or second difference form. 2) There is some slight evidence of
nonlinear demand effects on prices. 3) There is no evidence that demand
effects have gotten smaller over time. 4) The stimulus from the act combined
with large wealth effects from past household saving, rising stock prices, and
rising housing prices is large and is forecast to drive the unemployment rate
down to below 3.5 percent by the middle of 2022. 5) Given this stimulus,
the inflation rate is forecast to rise to slightly under 5 percent by the middle
of 2022 and then comes down slowly. 6) There is considerable uncertainty
in the point forecasts, especially two years out. The probability that inflation
will be larger than 6 percent next year is estimated to be 31.6 percent. 7) If
the Fed were behaving as historically estimated, it would raise the interest
rate to about 3 percent by the end of 2021 and 3.5 percent by the end of 2022
according to the forecast. This would lower inflation, although slowly. By
the middle of 2022 inflation would be about 1 percentage point lower. The
unemployment rate would be 0.5 percentage points higher.
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1 Introduction
The passage of the American Rescue Plan Act in March 2021 has led to much debate
about its future inflation consequences. Larry Summers (2021) among others has
argued that the inflation consequences could be severe. The Biden administration
and the Fed have argued there is likely to be a blip in inflation in 2021 but nothing
long lasting. Most of this discussion is based on casual empiricism rather than
econometric estimates. This paper takes an econometric approach and examines
what estimated price equations imply about future inflation. As of this writing data
are available for the first quarter of 2021, so the forecast period begins with the
second quarter of 2021. It ends in the fourth quarter of 2023.
The price and wage equations in my U.S. macroeconometric model (the US
model) are used as a base, but a number of price equations are examined. In
previous work1 I have argued that the data do not support the dynamics of the
expectations augmented Phillips curve, and this issue is examined further in this
paper. The dynamics of price equations are crucial for examining long run inflation
consequences from a short run blip. For example, are the Administration and the
Fed right in their view that there are no long run consequences? It will be seen
that the data support the specification of price equations in level form rather than
in first difference or second difference form. The NAIRU specification does not
appear to be supported by the data.
Another issue regarding the specification of price equations is which demand
variable to use. A common choice is the unemployment rate, perhaps subtracted
for a time varying “natural” rate. A problem with this choice is the linearity
assumption. As the economy moves into a regime of low unemployment rates, one
might expect a nonlinear response. One possibility is to use the reciprocal of the
unemployment rate, which is tried here. An output gap measure and its reciprocal
are also tried. Estimating nonlinear effects is difficult because there are few periods
1

Fair (2000) and updated in Fair (2018, Section 3.1.3).
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of very low unemployment rates; the Fed usually intervenes. Unfortunately, as will
be seen, inflation forecasts are sensitive to reciprocals versus levels.
Given a particular estimated price equation with, say, the unemployment rate
as an explanatory variable, one needs a forecast of future unemployment rates to
make an inflation forecast. The US model is used for this purpose. More will be
said about this below.
The US model is described in detail in a document on my website, “Macroeconometric Modeling: 2018,” which will be abbreviated “MM” (Fair (2018). Most
of my past macro research, including the empirical results, is in MM. It includes
chapters on methodology, econometric techniques, numerical procedures, theory,
empirical specifications, testing, and results. The results in my previous macro
papers have been updated through 2017 data, which provides a way of examining
the sensitivity of the original results to the use of additional data. It is too much
to explain the model in one paper, and I will rely on MM as the reference. Think
of MM as the appendix to this paper. In what follows the relevant sections in MM
will be put in brackets. The forecast used in this paper is also on the website. The
paper Fair (2020b) summarizes the main properties of the model.

2 Single Price Equations
2.1 Price Equations
Consider first a price equation not embedded in a wage-price sector. The expectations augmented Phillips curve is:
e
πt = πt+1
+ β(ut − u∗ ) + γst + t , β < 0, γ > 0,

(1)

e
where t is the time period, πt is the rate of inflation, πt+1
is the expected rate of

inflation for period t + 1, ut is the unemployment rate, st is a cost shock variable,
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t is an error term, and u∗ is the NAIRU.2
e
A key question is how πt+1
is determined. A common assumption is that
e
πt+1

=

n
X

δi πt−i ,

i=1

n
X

δi = 1.

(2)

i=1

This says that agents look only at past inflation in forming their expectations of
future inflation. An alternative is to embed equation (1) in a complete model and
assume rational expectations. One could solve (1) forward and use the model’s
e
. This is not done here. Inflation
future predictions of u and s to solve for πt+1

expectations are assumed to depend only on past inflation. An early paper supporting this is Fuhrer (1997). Coibion et al. (2020) review the recent literature on
how inflation expectations are formed. Household and firm expectations tend to
differ considerably from market expectations and those of professional forecasters.
There is evidence that the strongest predictor of household’s and firms’ inflation
forecasts are what they believe inflation has been in the recent past, which are not
always accurate beliefs. There is also little evidence that firms know much about
monetary policy targets. Further survey evidence regarding firms is in Candia et
al. (2021), which support these conclusions. It seems clear that firms’ inflation
expectations are not rational, nor even very sophisticated. The assumption used
here, that inflation expectations depend only on past inflation, may be the best that
one can do. The story consistent with this assumption is that as actual inflation
increases (from some shock) firms begin to perceive this, perhaps with a lag, which
affects their inflation expectations and pricing decisions.
Combining (1) and (2) yields:
πt =

n
X

∗

δi πt−i + β(ut − u ) + γst + t ,

i=1

n
X

δi = 1.

(3)

i=1

One restriction in equation (3) is that the δi coefficients sum to one. A second
restriction is that each price level is subtracted from the previous price level before
Some specifications take u∗ to be time varying. This is not done here. It’s hard to avoid
subjectivity in the choice of how the natural rate varies over time.
2
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entering the equation. These two restrictions are straightforward to test. Let pt be
the log of the price level for period t, and let πt be measured as pt −pt−1 . Using this
notation, equation (3) can be written in terms of p rather than π. If, for example,
n = 1, equation (3) becomes
pt = 2pt−1 − pt−2 + β(ut − u∗ ) + γst + t .

(4)

In other words, equation (3) can be written in terms of the current and past two price
levels,3 with restrictions on the coefficients of the past two price levels. Similarly,
if, say, n = 4, equation (3) can be written in terms of the current and past five
price levels, with two restrictions on the coefficients of the five past price levels.
(Denoting the coefficients on the past five price levels as a1 through a5 , the two
restrictions are a4 = 5 − 4a1 − 3a2 − 2a3 and a5 = −4 + 3a1 + 2a2 + a3 .) The
restrictions are easy to test by simply adding pt−1 and pt−2 to equation (3) and
testing whether they are jointly significant.
An equivalent test is to add πt−1 (i.e., pt−1 − pt−2 ) and pt−1 to equation (3).
Adding πt−1 breaks the restriction that the δi coefficients sum to one, and adding
both πt−1 and pt−1 breaks the summation restriction and the restriction that each
price level is subtracted from the previous price level before entering the equation.
This latter restriction can be thought of as a first derivative restriction, and the
summation restriction can be thought of as a second derivative restriction.

2.2 Data
A widely cited price deflator in the media is the price deflator for personal consumption expenditures (P CE). This is the price deflator targeted by the Fed. If,
however, one is interested in explaining the pricing behavior of agents in the U.S.
economy, P CE is not appropriate because it includes import prices (as well as
excluding export prices). The same is true of the consumer price index (CP I).
3

“Price level” will be used to describe p even though p is actually the log of the price level.
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Import prices reflect decisions of foreign agents and the behavior of exchange rates,
which are not decision variables of domestic agents. The price deflator used in the
following analysis is the price deflator of the U.S. firm sector, variable P F in the
US model, which reflects private, domestic decisions.
The measure of demand used in this section is the unemployment rate, denoted U R. Data on U R are from the BLS household survey. These data are
re-benchmarked each year and are not revised back, which can cause spikes in
some of the variables. This problem is not always addressed in the literature, especially in DSGE modeling—Fair (2020a). I have adjusted for this in the US model
using backward interpolation—[MM, Table A.5]. The cost shock variable used in
the analysis is taken to be the import price deflator (P IM ).
The estimation period is 1954.1–2019.4, ending in the last quarter before the
pandemic. . For the estimation of equation (3) n was taken to be 4, pt = log P Ft .
πt = pt − pt−1 , and ut = U Rt . st is postulated to be log P IMt − τ0 − τ1 t, the
deviation of log P IM from a trend line. Given these variables and the restriction
on the δi coefficients, the equation estimated is:
∆πt = λ0 + λ1 t +

4
X

δi (πt−i − πt−1 ) + βU Rt + γ log P IMt + t ,

(5)

i=2

where λ0 = −βu∗ − γτ0 and λ1 = γτ1 . u∗ is not identified in equation (5), but
for purposes of the tests this does not matter. If, however, one wanted to compute
the NAIRU (i.e., u∗ ), one would need a separate estimate of τ0 in order to estimate
u ∗ .4

2.3 Estimates
The results of estimating equation (5) are presented in column (1) in Table 1. In
column (2) πt−1 is added, and in column (3) both πt−1 and pt−1 are added.
Note that if u∗ follows a linear time trend, this will be picked up by the inclusion of t in the
equation.
4
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Table 1
Equation Estimates
Dependent Variable is ∆πt
(1)
Equation (5)

Variable
cnst
t
U Rt
log P IMt
πt−2 − πt−1
πt−3 − πt−1
πt−4 − πt−1
πt−1
pt−1
SE
χ2

Estimate

(2)
Equation (5)
πt−1 added
Estimate

t-stat.

t-stat.

(3)
Equation (5)
πt−1 added and
pt−1 added
Estimate t-stat.

0.0017
0.0000004
-0.0319
-0.0002
0.272
0.209
0.125

0.60
0.0071
0.05 -0.0000173
-1.56
-0.0367
0.0017
-0.16
4.16
0.233
0.169
3.20
0.076
2.00
-0.171

2.20
-0.0346
-1.63 0.0001821
-1.83
-0.1279
1.40
0.0342
3.57
0.085
2.59
0.080
1.21
0.033
-3.22
-0.663
-0.053

0.00435

0.00428

0.00380
82.81

-6.00
7.09
-6.12
8.47
1.40
1.35
0.59
-8.78
-8.34

• pt = log P Ft , πt = log(P Ft /P Ft−1 , U Rt = unemployment rate,
log P IM = log of the price of imports.
• Estimation method: ordinary least squares.
• Estimation period: 1954.1–2019:4.
• Five percent χ2 critical value = 5.99; one percent χ2 critical value =
9.21.
Comparing columns (1) and (2), Table 1 shows that when πt−1 is added, it is significant with a t-statistic of -3.22. When both πt−1 and pt−1 are added in column (3),
both are significant with t-statistics of -8.78 and -8.34 respectively. The χ2 value
for the hypothesis that the coefficients of both variables are zero is 82.81.5
5

Note that there is a large change in the estimate of the coefficient of the time trend when πt−1
and pt−1 are added. The time trend is serving a similar role in this equation as the constant term
is in equation (5).
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The results thus strongly reject equation (5) and equation (5) with πt−1 added.
Only the lagged inflation variables are significant, and there are very large changes
in the coefficient estimates when πt−1 and pt−1 are added. In particular, the coefficient estimates of the unemployment rate are much smaller in absolute value
without the two variables added.

2.4 Dynamics
The three equations in Table 1 have quite different dynamics, and it will be useful
to examine the differences. The question considered is the following: if the unemployment rate were permanently lowered by one percentage point, what would the
price level and inflation consequences be? To answer this question, the following
experiment was performed for each equation. A dynamic simulation was run beginning in 2021.2 using the actual values of all the variables from 2021.1 back. The
values of U R and P IM from 2021.2 forward were taken to be the actual values for
2021.1. Call this simulation the “base” simulation. A second dynamic simulation
was then run where the only change was that the unemployment rate was decreased
permanently by one percentage point from 2021.2 on. The difference between the
predicted value of π from this simulation and that from the base simulation for a
given quarter is the estimated effect of the change in U R on π. Similarly for p.6
The results for the three equations are presented in Table 2. It should be stressed
that these experiments are not meant to be realistic. For example, there is no Fed
reaction to the rise in inflation. The experiments are simply meant to help illustrate
how the equations differ in a particular dimension.
6
Because the equations are linear, it does not matter what values are used for P IM as long as
the same values are used for both simulations. Similarly, it does not matter what values are used
for U R as long as each value for the second simulation is one percentage point higher than the
corresponding value for the base simulation. Also, unless U R is exactly at the NAIRU, the base
simulation for equation (5) will either have an accelerating or decelerating inflation and price path.
The computed differences in this case are differences from the accelerating or decelerating path.
For equation (5) with πt−1 added, the base simulation will have an accelerating or decelerating
price path. For this reason results are presented in Table 2 only out 120 quarters.
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Table 2
Effects of a One Percentage Point Fall in U R
Equation (5)

Equation (5)
πt−1 added

Quar.

P new
−P base

π new
−π base

P new
−P base

π new
−π base

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
12
40
80
120

0.0003
0.0008
0.0014
0.0023
0.0033
0.0045
0.0058
0.0074
0.0157
0.1905
1.0446
3.4704

0.13
0.18
0.23
0.29
0.36
0.42
0.48
0.54
0.79
2.52
4.99
7.45

0.0004
0.0009
0.0016
0.0024
0.0034
0.0045
0.0058
0.0071
0.0134
0.0761
0.1789
0.2868

0.15
0.20
0.25
0.31
0.36
0.40
0.44
0.48
0.60
0.83
0.86
0.86

Equation (5)
πt−1 and
pt−1 added
P new
π new
−P base −π base
0.0014
0.0028
0.0044
0.0060
0.0076
0.0091
0.0106
0.0120
0.0164
0.0260
0.0267
0.0267

0.51
0.56
0.58
0.59
0.59
0.56
0.53
0.49
0.35
0.03
0.00
0.00

• P = price level (P F ), π = log P F − log P F−1
Consider the very long run properties in Table 2 first. For equation (5), the
new price level grows without bounds relative to the base price level and the new
inflation rate grows without bounds relative to the base inflation rate. For equation
(5) with πt−1 added, the new price level grows without bounds relative to the base,
but the inflation rate does not. It is 0.86 percentage points higher in the long run.
For equation (5) with both πt−1 and pt−1 added, the new price level is higher by
2.67 percent in the limit and the new inflation rate is back to the base.
The long run properties are thus vastly different, as is, of course, obvious from
the specifications. What is interesting, however, is that the effects on inflation are
close after, say, 8 quarters. The inflation differences, new minus base, are 0.54,
0.48, and 0.49, respectively. It is hard to distinguish among the equations based
only on their short run properties.
9

3 Price and Wage Equations
The results above support the specification of the price equation in level form,
and this form is used for the price and wage equations in the US model. Three
new variables are added to the analysis: W F , a wage rate of the firm sector,
D5G, the employer social security tax rate, and LAM , a measure of potential
labor productivity. The wage rate that measures the cost to the firm sector is
W F ·(1+D5G), the wage rate inclusive of employer social security taxes. LAM is
constructed from peak-to-peak interpolation of the log of actual labor productivity,
output divided by worker hours, for the 1952.1–2021.1 period. It’s growth rate
reflects the growth rate of potential productivity.7
Let p = log P F , wa = log[W F · (1 + D5G)] − log LAM , s = log P IM , and
d denote the demand variable. Then the price equation is
pt = β1 pt−1 + β2 wat + β0 + β3 t + β4 dt + β5 st + t .

(6)

This equation is equation (5) with πt−1 and pt−1 added, with the wage rate added,
and with only one lag of the price level.8
In the wage rate equation the wage rate runs off the price level. Let w =
log W F − log LAM . Then the wage rate equation is
wt = γ1 wt−1 + γ2 pt + γ3 pt−1 + γ0 + νt .

(7)

This equation says that wages respond to prices, but are not directly affected by
demand. Demand and cost shocks affect the price level, which then affects the wage
rate. The price equation is identified because the wage rate equation includes the
lagged wage rate, which the price equation does not. The wage rate equation
7

The peaks are 1955.2, 1963.3, 1966.1, 1973.1, 1992.4, and 2010.4, where the first line is
extended back to 1952.1 and where from 2011.1 on the annual growth rate was taken to be 1.50
percent. The annual growth rates between the six peaks are 3.40, 2.73, 2.54, 1.56, and 2.01,
respectively.
8
In equation (5) s equaled log P IM − τ0 − τ1 t. Here s is just log P IM since equation (6)
already includes a constant term and time trend.
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is identified because the price equation includes dt and st , which the wage rate
equation does not.
A constraint is imposed on the coefficients in the wage rate equation to ensure
that the determination of the real wage implied by the two equations is sensible.
The relevant parts of the two equations regarding the constraint are
pt = β1 pt−1 + β2 wt + . . . ,

(8)

wt = γ1 wt−1 + γ2 pt + γ3 pt−1 + . . . .

(9)

The implied real wage equation from these two equations should not have wt − pt
as a function of either wt or pt separately, since one does not expect the real wage
to grow simply because the levels of wt and pt are growing. The desired form of
the real wage equation is thus
wt − pt = δ1 (wt−1 − pt−1 ) + . . . ,

(10)

which says that the real wage is a function of its own lagged value plus other
terms. The real wage in equation (10) is not a function of the level of wt or pt
separately. The constraint on the coefficients in equations (8) and (9) that imposes
this restriction is:
γ3 = [β1 /(1 − β2 )](1 − γ2 ) − γ1 .

(11)

This constraint is imposed in the estimation by first estimating the price equation to
get estimates of β1 and β2 and then using these estimates to impose the constraint
on γ3 in the wage rate equation.
The time trend, t, in the price equation is meant to pick up any trend effects
on the price level not captured by the other variables. Adding the time trend to
an equation like this (in level form) is similar to adding the constant term to an
equation specified in terms of changes rather than levels. The time trend will also
pick up any trend mistakes made in constructing LAM . It also accounts for the
trend in P IM .
11

The demand variable used in the previous section is the unemployment rate,
U R. Three other variables are tried here: 1/U R, GAP , and 1/(GAP + .07),
where GAP is an estimate of the output gap. The .07 is added to GAP in the
reciprocal to ensure that the denominator does not go negative.9 The form of the
demand variable is an important question for forecasting 2021 and beyond since
the economy may be pushed to capacity, which is the reason for the use of the
reciprocals.
Table 2 includes four estimates of equation (6), for the four demand variables. Each is highly significant. The estimated standard errors are, respectively,
0.003769, 0.003711, 0.003846, and 0.003927. 1/U Rt has the lowest standard
error and 1/(GAPt + .07) has the highest, but they are all close. The estimates of
the other coefficients are not sensitive to the demand variable used except for the
coefficient estimate of wat when GAP is used. Although not shown in the table,
when when both 1/U Rt and U Rt are included together in the equation, the coefficient estimate for 1/U Rt is 0.000364 with a t-statistic of 1.96 and the coefficient
estimate for U Rt is -0.079 with a t-statisitc of -1.49. The estimated standard error
is 0.003717. 1/U Rt is thus slightly better.
An estimate of the wage rate equation (7) is presented in Table 4. The constraint
for this estimate is based on the coefficient estimates of the price equation with
1/U R as the demand variable, the second equation in Table 3. As noted above,
this equation simply reflects the assumption that wages follow prices.
The equations in Tables 3 and 4 are estimated by two stage least squares (2SLS).
The main first stage regressors aside from the one-quarter lagged values of the
explanatory variables in the equation are one-quarter lagged values of the log of
real per capita government purchases of goods and services, the log of real per
9

The output gap in the US model is defined as (Y S − Y )/Y S, where Y is the actual output
of the firm sector and Y S is a measure of potential output. Y S is computed from peak to peak
interpolations of log Y over the 1952.1–2021.1 period. The peaks are 1953.2, 1966.1, 1973.2,
1999.4, 2006.4, and 2019.1, where tre the first line is extended back to 1952.1 and the last line is
extended forward to 2021.1. The annual growth rates between the six peaks are 4.09, 3.67, 3.24,
2.65, and 1.83, respectively.
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Table 3
Equation (6) Estimates
Dependent Variable is log P Ft

Variable

d=UR
Estimate t-stat.

d=1/UR
Estimate t-stat.

d=GAP
Estimate t-stat.

d=1/(GAP+.07)
Estimate t-stat.

log P Ft−1
wat
cnst
t
log P IMt
dt

0.882 88.93
0.877 88.35
0.913 92.11
0.0471
4.67
0.0550 5.47
0.0191 1.83
-0.0320 -4.05
-0.0361 -4.40
-0.0181 -2.23
0.000243 11.98 0.000230 11.54 0.000220 10.64
0.0496 22.19
0.0448 21.45
0.0495 21.96
-0.176 9.30 0.000624 9.53
-0.111 -9.12

0.915 90.16
0.0188
1.76
-0.0507 -5.84
0.000217 10.29
0.0440 20.78
0.001123 8.51

SE

0.003769

0.003927

0.003711

0.003846

• wat = log[W Ft (1 + D5Gt )] − log LAMt
• Estimation method: two stage least squares.
• Estimation period: 1954.1–2019:4.
Table 4
Equation (7) Estimates
Dependent Variable is log W Ft − log LAMt
Variable

Estimate

log W Ft−1 − log LAMt−1
log P Ft
cnst
log P Ft−1
SE

t-stat.

0.943 52.04
0.926 34.05
-0.0371 -3.19
0.928
0.007824

• Coefficient for log P Ft−1 constrained.
• Estimation method: two stage least squares.
• Estimation period: 1954.1–2019:4.
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capita government transfer payments other than unemployment benefits, and the
log of real per capita exports. No current quarter values are used as first stage
regressors. The complete list of first stage regressors is in MM, Table A.9.
A popular question in current work is whether the Phillips curve has become
flatter. Focusing on the second equation in Table 3, the price equation in the US
model with 1/U R as the demand variable, the question is whether the coefficient of
1/U R has become smaller over time. The coefficient estimate is in fact relatively
stable. The estimation period begins in 1954.1. When the equation is estimated
through 1971.1, 69 observations, the coefficient estimate is 0.000755, which compares to 0.000624 in Table 3. When the end point is extended one quarter at a time,
the largest estimate is 0.000762 in 1972.3 and the smallest estimate is 0.000549 in
2008.2. All the coefficient estimates are significant. This is a small range for this
kind of work.
What does not work, however, is to do a rolling regression of, say, 20 years
(80 quarters). Here the variation in the coefficient estimates is large. The problem
with this procedure in my view is that the sample size is too small. As one rolls
out of the mid 1980’s, the inflation experience in the late 1960’s, 1970’s, and mid
1980’s is lost, and one enters a much smoother period regarding inflation. Using 80
quarters, the last sample period is 2000.1–2019.4, which is clearly not typical of the
historical experience of inflation. It should not be surprising that price equations
estimated for this period are considerably different from ones estimated earlier or
for a longer period. Not using information through the 1980’s is problematic.

4 Demand Assumptions
There are seven price equations to consider: the three in Table 1 and the four in
Table 3. Five require future values of U R and two require future values of GAP .
The forecast period is 2021.2–2023.4, 11 quarters. The US model is used for the
forecasts. A key issue for the forecasts is how to account for the American Rescue
14

Plan Act (ARPA) passed in March 2021. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO)
and the Joint Committee on Taxation (JCT) have estimated the budget outlays
from this act: $1,088 billion in FY2021, $476 billion in FY2022, $115 billion in
FY2023, and then relatively small amounts after that. Some of this was spent in
2021.1. From the national income and product accounts (NIPA) released April
29, 2021, federal transfer payments to persons (T R) was larger in 2021.1 versus
2020.1, the last “normal” quarter before the pandemic, by $686 billion at a quarterly
rate. Grants-in-aid to state and local (S&L) governments (GIA) was larger by $39
billion, and subsidies (SU B) was larger by $82 billion. This total, $807 billion, is
assumed to be due to the ARPA. This leaves $281 billion left for 2021.2 and 2021.3
using the CBO and JCT estimate of $1,088 billion for FY2021. I have allocated
this 60/40 in the two quarters, so $169 billion in 2021.2 and $112 billion in 2021.3.
For the next four quarters I have allocated the $476 evenly, so $119 billion each.
For the next four quarters I have allocated the $115 billion evenly, so $29 billion
each.
These values are in nominal terms. To convert them to real terms, I took the
value of the GDP deflator in 2021.1, let it grow at an annual rate of 3 percent, and
used these values to deflate the nominal values. The 11 values over the 11 quarters
in billions of dollars are 145, 96,101, 100, 99, 99, 24, 24, 24, and 23. (The actual
$807 billion nominal value in 2021.1 is $699 billion in real terms.) Although some
of this additional spending will take the form of increased real GIA and increased
SU B, for purposes of the forecast all has been put in real T R. SU B was taken
to be $20 billion in each of the 11 quarters, roughly its value in 2020.1. Real
GIA was taken to grow at an annual rate of 3 percent from 2021.2 on using as a
base value its value in 2020.1. In addition, S&L government transfer payments
to persons was taken to grow at an annual rate of 3 percent using as a base value
its value in 2020.1.10 Real T R was taken to grow at an annual rate of 3 percent
10
The values of S&L transfer payments were higher during the pandemic as S&L governments
passed on some of the increased GIA to persons. Since only normal growth is assumed for real
GIA for the forecast, only normal growth was assumed for S&L transfer payments to persons.
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using as a base value its value in 2020.1 and then the additions discussed above
were added to these values. T R is part of disposable income, which in the model
affects household expenditures, both consumption and housing investment.
Since some of the additional spending from ARPA will go to subsidies and
GIA, the implicit assumption used here is that the multiplier effects from these
two variables are the same as the multiplier effects from T R. The real output
multipliers from increasing real T R by 1 for the 11 quarters are respectively: 0.11,
0.25, 0.36, 0.45, 0.51, 0.55, 0.58, 0.60, 0.62, 0.63, and 0.64. The initial effects
are thus small, rising to a multiplier of about half after 4 quarters. As is obvious
from the large increases in the personal saving rate after the pandemic stimulus
payments, households initially save much of the increase transfer payments.
Some of the other assumptions for the forecast are as follows (all growth rates
are at annual rates): tax rates unchanged from their 2021.1 values, real exports
growing at 3 percent, the price of imports growing at 3 percent, Y S growing at 3
percent, LAM growing at 1.5 percent, and the relative price of housing growing
at 5 percent. In addition, the estimated Fed rule is dropped and the short term
interest rate in the model (RS, the three-month Treasury bill rate) is assumed to
be unchanged from its 2021.1 value, which is 5 basis points. The forecast and all
the assumptions are on my website.
Nothing was done about possible tax and spending changes from the Biden
administration’s proposed infrastructure plans. The current forecast is obviously
a conditional forecast, conditional on nothing new done after the ARPA. As least
for the first year or two “nothing new” is likely not a bad approximation since it
will take time for the legislation to be passed if it is and for the beginning of the
increased spending and taxes.
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Table 5
Forecasts for 2021.2–2023.4

2021.1a
2021.2
2021.3
2021.4
2022.1
2022.2
2022.3
2022.4
2023.1
2023.2
2023.3
2023.4

%∆Y

GAP

UR

7.4
12.8
9.6
6.3
4.2
3.4
3.3
2.6
2.5
2.7
2.9
2.9

0.022
-0.001
-0.017
-0.025
-0.028
-0.029
-0.029
-0.027
-0.027
-0.027
-0.027
-0.027

6.2
5.5
4.7
4.0
3.6
3.4
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.3
3.3
3.3

• a Actual
• %∆Y = percentage change in
real output, annual rate.
The second price equation in Table 3, the one using 1/U R, was used for the
forecast. It makes little difference to the forecasts of the unemployment rate and
output which price equation is used. The results for output, the gap, and the unemployment rate are presented in Table 5. The predicted output growth rate is
12.8 percent for 2021.2. (All growth rates are at annual rates.) This large rate is
in part due to household wealth, which is large from past transfer payments saved
and from past large increases in stock and housing prices. This has a large effect
on household expenditures, including housing investment. The high growth rate
is also due in part to a large predicted inventory correction in 2021.2 (inventory
investment was negative and large in absolute vlaue in 2021.1.) In addition, T R is
large from the ARPA. The predicted output growth rate is also large in 2021.3 and
2021.4 at 9.6 and 6.3 percent respectively. This is from the continuing wealth effects and the continuing large transfer payments. The output gap becomes negative
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in 2021.2, falling from 0.022 to -0.001. By 2021.4 it is -0.024. The unemployment
rate falls from 6.2 percent in 2021.1 to 5.5 percent in 2021.2. By 2022.1 it is down
to 3.6 percent. None of this is, of course, surprising. The U.S. economy has had
a huge fiscal stimulus, a huge increase in financial and housing wealth, and an
accommodating monetary policy.
The forecast details are on my website, but it is instructive to give a few more
details here. Comparing 2021.1 to 2019.4, private jobs fell by 7.93 million, government jobs fell by 1.12 million, and the number of people holding two jobs
(moonlighters) fell by 1.55 million. The number of people employed, which is
jobs minus moonlighters, thus fell by 7.50 million. Had there been no change in
the labor force, the number of people unemployed would have increased by 7.50
million. In fact it increased by only 4.09 million because the labor force fell by
3.41 million. The unemployment rate rose from 3.6 percent to 6.2 percent.
How fast is the economy forecasted to come back? Comparing the forecast
values for 2022.1 to the actual values in 2021.1, private jobs rose by 5.78 million,
government jobs rose by 0.24 million, and moonlighters rose by 0.97 million.
The number of people employed thus rose by 5.05 million. The labor force rose
by 0.96 million, so the number of people unemployed fell by 4.09 million. The
unemployment rate fell from 6.2 percent to 3.6 percent. Had the labor force
been forecast to come back to where it was, the fall in the unemployment would
obviously been less. One of the reasons for the small forecasted rise in the labor
force relative to how much it fell is that household wealth has a negative effect on
labor supply in the labor force participation equations, and, as noted above, there
are large increases in household wealth. The labor force is not back to its 2019.4
value until 2023.3. The number of private jobs is back by 2022.3.
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5 Inflation Forecasts
Given the unemployment rate values in Table 5, what are the inflation forecasts?
The first three columns in Table 6 present the forecasts using the three equations in
Table 1. Although the first two equations are rejected by the data, it is of interest to
see what they imply. Equation (5) has an increasing inflation rate, from 2.7 percent
in 2021.2 to 4.7 percent in 2023.4. Equation (5) with πt−1 added has a roughly
constant inflation rate at about 2.5 percent. Equation (5) with πt−1 and pt−1 added
has an inflation rate rising to 3.4 percent in 2022.1 and then leveling out at about
3.7 percent. The low inflation rate forecasts from equation (5) with πt−1 added are
low in part because the coefficient on U R (Table 1) is fairly low in absolute value.
Presented next in Table 6 are four inflation forecasts from the US model, using
the four price equations in Table 3. Each of the four forecasts corresponds to a
slightly different estimated wage rate equation because the coefficient constraint
uses the estimates from the price equation. Also, each forecast corresponds to
slightly different unemployment rate and gap forecasts because the two variables
are endogenous. However, these differences are small across the four forecasts.
Column (4) contains the forecast using U R as the explanatory variable in the price
equation. These forecast values are similar to those in column (3) since the two
price equations are similar—both use the level of the unemployment rate and both
are in level form. Column (5) is for 1/U R as the explanatory variable in the
price equation. Remember that this is the best fitting equation. After the first two
quarters the inflation forecasts in column (5) are larger than those in column (4),
which uses U R. By the middle of 2022 they are about 1 percentage point higher,
with an inflation rate of 3.7 percent. Given the low values of the unemployment
rate, the nonlinearity is predicting more inflation.
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Table 6
Inflation Forecasts for 2021.2–2023.4
Using Various Price Equations
(1)
2021.1a
2021.2
2021.3
2021.4
2022.1
2022.2
2022.3
2022.4
2023.1
2023.2
2023.3
2023.4

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7
2.7 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.6 2.7 3.2
3.4 2.7 2.8 2.7 2.5 3.5 5.2
3.4 2.6 3.1 3.2 3.5 3.8 6.6
3.6 2.6 3.4 3.5 4.2 3.9 6.9
3.7 2.5 3.5 3.7 4.6 3.9 6.8
3.9 2.5 3.7 3.7 4.8 3.9 6.6
4.0 2.5 3.8 3.7 4.8 3.8 6.0
4.2 2.5 3.8 3.6 4.6 3.7 5.3
4.4 2.5 2.8 3.5 4.3 3.6 4.9
4.5 2.4 3.7 3.5 4.1 3.5 4.6
4.7 2.4 3.7 3.5 4.0 3.5 4.3

• a Actual
• Inflation is the percentage change in
P F at an annual rate.
• Price equations are as follows:
• (1): Table 1 (1) U R
• (2): Table 1 (2) U R
• (3): Table 1 (3) U R
• (4): Table 2 (1) U R
• (5): Table 2 (2) 1/U R
• (6): Table 2 (3) GAP
• (7): Table 2 (4) 1/(GAP + .07)
Columns (6) and (7) use GAP and 1/(GAP + .07). The forecast values
using GAP are slightly higher than those using U R, although the forecasts using
1/(GAP + .07) are much higher than those using 1/U R. By the end of 2021
the inflation rate is up to 6.6 percent using 1/(GAP + .07). Probably less weight
should be put on the GAP results since the equations do not fit quite as well. This
does, however, show the fragility of macroeconometric research. While the fits
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are fairly close, the implications are quite different.
In Table 6 the most weight should probably be place on column (5), which uses
1/U R in the price equation. This gives the best fit, and 1/U R is better than U R
when both are included in the equation. The reason for the low inflation forecasts
for the first two quarters is that the unemployment rate is still fairly high. Once the
unemployment rate gets down to about 3.5 percent, the inflation forecasts increase
to over 4 percent. They are coming down at the end, but slowly. An interesting
question is if this turns out to be the case, will the Fed step in and if so how effective
will it be? This question is examined in Section 7. Another interesting question
is how uncertain are these forecasts? What are the standard errors, and what is
the probability of inflation getting much higher, like 6 percent? This question is
examined next.

6 Stochastic Simulation
Stochastic simulation can be used to estimate the uncertainty of the above forecasts.
The US model consists of 23 estimated equations, not counting the estimated Fed
rule. It is estimated by 2SLS for the 1954.1–2019.4 period, 264 quarters. Thus
for each estimated equation there are 264 estimated residuals.11 In addition, two
other estimated equations were added. In the model the price of imports (P IM )
and the relative price of housing (P SI14) are exogenous. For the first equation
the log change in P IM was regressed on a constant, and for the second equation
the log change in P SI14 was regressed on a constant. Adding these two equations
to the model allows the uncertainty from the two to affect the overall uncertainty
estimates. P IM is like an asset price in that it is affected by oil prices and
exchange rates. Similarly, the relative price of housing is an asset price. The
11

If the initial estimate of an equation suggests that the error term is serially correlated, the
equation is reestimated under the assumption that the error term follows an autoregressive process
(usually first order). The structural coefficients in the equation and the autoregressive coefficient
or coefficients are jointly estimated (by 2SLS).
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expanded model thus has 25 estimated equations. Let ût denote the 25-dimension
vector of estimated residuals for quarter t, t = 1, ..., 264. The ût error terms are
after adjustment for any autoregressive properties, and they are taken to be iid for
purposes of the draws.
The solution period is 2021.2–2023.4, 11 quarters. The model was solved
10,000 times for this period. Each trial is as follows. First, 11 error vectors are
drawn with replacement from the 264 error vectors ût , t = 1, ..., 264. These errors
are added to the equations and the model is solved dynamically for the 2021.2–
2023.4 period. The predicted values are recorded. This is one trial. This procedure
is then repeated 10,000 times, which gives 10,000 predicted values of each variable.
The mean and standard error and other measures can then be computed for each
variable. See Sections 2.6 and 2.7 in MM for more details. When this was done
there were 80 solution errors, and in these cases the trial was skipped. There are
thus 9,920 trials. This means that the uncertainty estimates are at least slightly too
low since the solution errors are due to extreme draws.
Results are reported here for four variables: U R four and eight quarters ahead
and the four-quarter percentage change in P F for the first and second four-quarter
periods, 2022.1–2021.1 and 2023.1–2022.1. For U R to two predicted values are
3.63 and 3.24 with standard errors of 0.75 and 1.03. For the four-quarter ahead
percentage changes in P F the two predicted values are 2.95 and 4.70 with standard
errors of 1.29 and 3.20. There is thus more uncertainty in the inflation forecasts
than in the unemployment rate forecasts.
According to these results, how likely is it that inflation will be quite high. If
one takes “quite high” as the four-quarter percentage change in P F in the second
four-quarter period greater or equal to 6 percent, there were 3,131 trials in which
this was true, or 0.316 percent. This reflects the fact that there is considerable
uncertainty in the second four-quarter forecast of inflation.
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Table 7
Forecasts for 2021.2–2023.4 Using the Fed Rule

2021.1a
2021.2
2021.3
2021.4
2022.1
2022.2
2022.3
2022.4
2023.1
2023.2
2023.3
2023.4

Estimated Fed Rule
RS %∆Y U R %∆P F

RS

0.1
0.8
1.9
2.6
3.0
3.2
3.4
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.6

0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1
0.1

7.4
12.6
8.9
5.1
2.7
1.8
1.6
1.1
1.1
1.5
1.9
2.1

6.2
5.5
4.7
4.2
3.9
3.8
3.8
3.9
4.1
4.3
4.4
4.5

3.7
1.6
2.5
3.3
3.7
3.8
3.7
3.4
3.1
2.8
2.7
2.6

No Fed Rule
%∆Y U R %∆P F
7.4
12.8
9.6
6.3
4.2
3.4
3.3
2.6
2.5
2.7
2.9
2.9

6.2
5.5
4.7
4.0
3.6
3.4
3.2
3.2
3.2
3.3
3.3
3.3

3.7
1.6
2.5
3.5
4.2
4.6
4.8
4.8
4.6
4.3
4.1
4.0

• a Actual
• RS = three month Treasury bill rate
• %∆Y = percentage change in real output, annual rate.
• %∆P F = percentage change in P F , annual rate.

7 Fed Response
For the above forecasts the Fed is assumed to keep the short term interest rate
at essentially zero. There is an estimated Fed rule in the US model, which has
been turned off. The estimated rule is a “leaning against the wind” rule, where
the interest rate rises as inflation rises and unemployment falls. In practice if the
inflation numbers are as in column (5) in Table 6, the Fed is likely to respond by
raising the interest rate. How effective would this be in lowering inflation? This
can be examined in the model by turning the rule back on. Table 7 presents a
forecast in which the rule is added to the model from the beginning of the forecast
period. . The price equation used is the one with 1/U R as the demand variable.

23

As expected, the results in Table 7 show that given the low values of the
unemployment rate and the high values of inflation, the Fed rule calls for an increase
in the interest rate. The rate is 0.8 percent in 2021.2, the 1.9 percent, 2.6 percent, and
then 3.0 percent in 2022.1. The unemployment rate is higher and inflation is lower,
but not by much. What these results show, which is a property of the model, is that
the Fed has limited ability to affect the inflation rate. The Fed is currently saying
that it has the tools needed to stop high inflation if it gets started, but not according
to the model. It is clear in the model why this is true. If inflation expectations
depend only on past inflation, the only way the Fed can change expectations over
time is by changing actual inflation. Actual inflation is changed by changing the
unemployment rate (or the output gap).
To get a sense of how effective monetary policy is in changing output, the
unemployment rate, and inflation, I ran the following experiment. For the forecast
period, 2021.2–2023.4, I increased RS from the base path by 1 percentage point
(the Fed rule obviously dropped). The percentage decreases in real output for
the 11 quarters are: 0.06, 0.18, 0.33, 0.47, 0.59, 0.69, 0.77, 0.83, 0.88, 0.92, and
0.96. There is thus about a half a percentage point decrease after 4 quarters and
about a full percentage point after 11 quarters. The effects build slowly. The
unemployment rate increases are (in percentage points): 0.01, 0.04, 0.10, 0.15,
0.21, 0.25, 0.29, 0.31, 0.33, 0.34, and 0.35. The unemployment rate thus rises by
about a third of a percentage point for a 1 percentage point increase in RS, but
it takes about two years to reach this. The percentage point decreases in inflation
are: 0.01, 0.05, 0.15, 0.29, 0.47, 0.54, 0.59, 0.59, 0.56, 0.52, and 0.49. The effects
on inflation are thus about a half percentage point fall for a 1 percentage point
increase in RS, but it takes about 5 quarters to achieve this. The results in Table 7
are thus not surprisng given these effects.
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8 Conclusion
The main results are:
1. The data suggest that price equations should be specified in level form rather
than in first or second difference form (Table 1).
2. The is some slight evidence of nonlinear demand effects on prices in that
1/U R gives slightly better results than U R (Table 3).
3. There is no evidence that demand effects have gotten smaller over time.
4. The stimulus from the American Rescue Plan Act combined with large
wealth effects from past household saving, rising stock prices, and rising
housing prices is large and it is forecast to drive the unemployment rated
down to below 3.5 percent by the middle of 2022 (Table 5).
5. Given this stimulus, the inflation rate is forecast to rise to slightly under 5
percent by the middle of 2022 and comes down slowly. If U R is used in the
price equation rather than 1/U R, the inflation rate rises to slightly under 4
percent (Table 6).
6. There is considerable uncertainty in the point forecasts, especially two years
out. The probability that inflation will be larger than 6 percent next year is
estimated to be 31.6 percent.
7. If the Fed were behaving as historically estimated by the Fed rule, it would
raise the interest rate to about 3 percent by the end of 2021 and 3.5 percent by
the end of 2022. This would lower output growth, raise the unemployment
rate, and lower inflation, although lowering inflation takes time. By the
middle of 2022 inflation is about 1 percentage point lower. By the end of
2023 it is 1.4 percentage points lower (Table 7). The only tool the Fed has
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to lower inflation according to the model is to increase the unemployment
rate by raising interest rates. This effect is modest and takes time.
The estimated price equations do not take into account any special features
of the pandemic. They are estimated through 2019.4 and then used to forecast
2021.2 and beyond. If there are unusual supply constraints, pandemic related, this
might lead to the forecasts of inflation for, say, the second and third quarters of
2021 being too low. For example, the 1.6 and 2.5 inflation rates in column (5) in
Table 6 for 2021.2 and 2012.3 could be too low. If one subjectively adjusted the
price equations to have higher inflation rates in 2021.2 and 2021.3, the story in this
paper would be the same except with higher future inflation rates.
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